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We examine short interests in equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
between 1994 and 2001. Our results show that only high levels (the 90
th 
percentile) of short interest are associated with significant negative REIT 
returns as the bearish content of short interest may have been mitigated by 
the favorable risk characteristics of real estate securities. In addition, the 
significant negative relationship between short interest and REIT returns 
applies only to REITs with poor performance. The result implies that the 
bearish sentiment of short interest could also be mitigated by good REIT 
managers in a real estate market that is informationally inefficient. The results 
of a logistic regression model further show that the short selling of REIT 
shares can be explained by firm-specific factors such as operating efficiency, 
fundamental value, and liquidity. Given that short interest is not 
indiscriminately associated with negative REIT returns and that the short 
positions are firm-specific, the results are consistent with implications that 
short interests in REITs represent attempts to make short-term profits rather 





short interest, real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
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Introduction 
 
The real estate investment trust (REIT) industry has experienced a 
phenomenal growth in the last decade. The market capitalization of the REIT 
universe has increased from US$8.7 billion in 1990 to $138.7 billion in 2000 
(source: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts).   Investors 
are interested in REITs because the investment trusts offer an inexpensive 
way to invest in real estate related assets conveniently and indirectly. 
Investing in real estate is also attractive because despite historical returns on 
real estate that are equal to or slightly lower than returns on common stocks, 
real estate possesses very favorable risk characteristics. Specifically, real 
estate has a much lower standard deviation and either low positive or 
negative correlations with other asset classes in a portfolio context (Reilly 
and Brown, 2000).  
 
In this study, we investigate the short selling of REIT shares by investors. 
Short selling refers to the selling of shares that you do not own with the 
expectation that you will be able to return the borrowed shares by buying 
them later at a lower market price. The short selling of REIT shares may 
imply either investors want to capture some short-term profits or that 
investors are bearish about the advantage of real estate investments. The 
implications for the REIT industry would be significant if investors sell short 
REIT shares because they no longer consider real estate investments offer 
favorable risk characteristics. Given that the REIT industry is relatively 
homogenous and well defined (Chui et al. 2003), the information content of 
short interests (short interest is defined as the ratio of shares sold short to the 
number of shares outstanding) in REITs is conceivably quite consistent and 
less likely to give out conflicting signals. If short interest is not invariably 
associated with negative REIT returns and that the short interest can be 
determined by some firm-specific REIT characteristics, then the short 
positions are likely attempts to make short-term profits. If investors 
indiscriminately associate short interests in REITs, regardless of their 
magnitudes, with negative information, then it is consistent with the 
implication that investors are bearish about real estate investments. A 
possible explanation is that investors are concerned about the risk 
characteristics specific to the REIT industry. Based on the above, we believe 
an examination of the short interests in REIT shares would reveal 
information that has important implications for the REIT industry.   
 
We examine the short interests in equity REITs between 1994 and 2001. We 
find that only high levels (the 90
th percentile) of short interest are associated 
with significant negative REIT returns. Lower levels of short interest have 
no significant correlation with REIT returns as the bearish content of short 
interest could have been mitigated by the favorable risk characteristics of Li and Yung  58
     
real estate securities or the contribution of professional REIT managers. Our 
analysis shows that only those REITs with poor performance (negative 
performance alpha) have a significant negative relation between short 
interest and REIT returns. That is, short interest is not indiscriminately 
associated with negative REIT returns. The results of a logistic regression 
model also show that the short selling of REIT shares can be explained by 
firm-specific factors. Specifically, the short selling of REIT shares is related 
to operating efficiency, fundamental value, and liquidity. In sum, the results 
are consistent with implications that short interests in REITs represent 
attempts to make short-term profits rather than general bearishness about 





Short selling is legal in the United States. Institutional and legal restrictions, 
however, have made short selling costly in general. For example, SEC 
(Securities Exchange Commission) Rule 10a-1 provides that the short seller 
must secure a buyer who will pay a price higher than the previous trade or a 
price equal to the previous trade if the trade were itself an increase. In 
addition, the short seller must pay any dividends due to the investor who lent 
the stock, and the short seller is required to return the stock to the lender in a 
so-called short squeeze. While short sellers can rarely access all short sale 
proceeds, short sellers must also post the same margin as an investor who 
had acquired the stock. Nevertheless, market statistics show that short 
interest has increased over time.  
 
Investors sometimes sell short for non-speculative reasons. Specifically, an 
investor may sell short to exploit mispricing situations. Some of these 
activities include index arbitrage and merger arbitrage in which an 
underpriced asset is purchased while the related overpriced asset is sold 
simultaneously. An investor may also sell short for tax reason. Towards the 
end of a fiscal year, an investor may sell short the security that he owns so 
that the capital gains are deferred to the following taxable year when the 
short position is closed. In the derivatives markets, put option writers also 
would sell short the underlying common stocks in order to hedge their 
option positions. When investors sell short for non-speculative reasons, short 
interest and stock returns are not expected to show any correlation.  
 
Speculative reasons, however, are the more frequently cited cause of short 
selling. When an investor believes a common stock is overpriced, the 
investor would sell short with the expectation that the shares can be bought 
back later in the market at a lower price. A survey performed in 1947 (cited 
by McDonald and Baron (1973)) indicated that about two-thirds of the total Short Interests in Real Estate Investment Trusts    59
   
short interest was due to the speculative motive. When speculative reasons 
are involved, the relationship between short interest and stock returns can be 
negative or positive. According to Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), since 
short selling is costly, short sales by liquidity traders are less likely. 
Therefore, short selling is mostly conducted by information traders and 
conveys negative information, which implies a negative relationship 
between short interest and stock returns. On the other hand, technical 
investors argue that a high level of short interest is associated with 
subsequent positive stock returns because the short positions will have to be 
covered eventually.  
 
Academic research however is not unanimous concerning the relationship 
between short interest and stock returns. For example, see Figleswki (1981), 
Conrad (1986), Vu and Carter (1987), Brent et al. (1990), Bhattacharya and 
Gallinger (1991), Senchack and Starks (1993), Choie and Hwang (1994), 
and Woolridge and Dickinson (1994). Desai et al. (2002) attribute the failure 
of these studies in finding a strong and consistent relationship between short 
interest and abnormal stock returns to the use of data reported by the media 
or the use of small random samples. Among the very few studies that 
examine the entire population of short interest, Aitken et al. (1998) examine 
all the short trades occurred on the Australian Stock Exchange between 
January 1994 and December 1996 and find that short sales represent an 
almost instantaneously bad news. Despite Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) 
and Desai et al. (2002) both use large data samples, they focus only on firms 
with high short interest (short interest ratios of 2.5% or higher) in reporting a 
significant negative relationship between short interest and stock returns.  In 
a recent study, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2004) have expressed serious 
concern about the results of Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) and Desai et al. 
(2002). Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2004) find that the relationship between 
short interest and stock returns is more ambiguous than the recent literature 
suggests. Moreover, they also find that the negative performance of stocks 
with high short interest is less persistent than Desai et al. report.  In sum, the 
literature has not reached a consensus regarding the relationship between 
short interest and abnormal stock returns. As a result, a detailed investigation 
of the short selling of REIT securities appears important.  
 
  
Data and Basic Statistics 
 
We search the 2002 CRSP files for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms for 
our sample of publicly traded equity REITs. Our sample size varies from 
100 in 1994 to 152 in 2001. In our sample, we have also included all the 
equity REITs that are later delisted due to various reasons. Our sample size 
is consistent with those reported by other researchers over the similar period.  Li and Yung  60
     
Data on REIT returns, trading volume, shares outstanding, and market 
capitalization are collected from the CRSP data file, while data on book 
value and return on asset (ROA) are collected from the COMPUSTAT data 
file.
1   Monthly data of short interest are collected from various issues of the 
Standard and Poor’s Daily Price Record. Variables such as the SML (the 
size factor), HML (the market-to-book factor), and PR1YR (the momentum 
factor) are gathered from the website of Kenneth French (see Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997)). The index for measuring activities of the 
REIT market is the NAREIT (National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts) monthly index.  
 
Table 1 reports selected basic statistics regarding the short interests in REITs 
over the sample period. The mean (median) short interest ranges from 0.26% 
(0.11%) to 0.73% (0.42%) between 1994 and 2001.
2  The increase, except in 
a few years, appears to be monotonic in nature. The sizable increase in the 
short interests in REITs is consistent with the general trend of increasing 
short interest in the NASDAQ market between 1988 and 1994 as reported by 
Desai et al. (2002).  
  
Table 1: Distribution of short interest over the sample period (1994-2001) 
   
Panel A:  Short interest by year 
Year       # REITs       Mean     Median          25
th Percentile       75
th Percentile 
        (%)       (%)    (%)                   (%)  
1994     101     0.30      0.13    0.04    0.28 
1995     102     0.26      0.11    0.04    0.23 
1996     110     0.28      0.11    0.06    0.30 
1997       142     0.52      0.17    0.08    0.54 
1998     155     0.46      0.15    0.07    0.53 
1999     174     0.55      0.23    0.07    0.65 
2000     168     0.64      0.31    0.10    0.71 
2001     152     0.73      0.42    0.17    0.86    
 
Panel B:  Number of observations in each short interest sub-sample by year  
    90
th   75
th     60
th             50
th  
                Percentile                   Percentile               Percentile             Percentile 
1994    71    178    285             356 
1995    86    216    345             431 
1996    106    265    423             529 
1997    134    335    536             670 
1998    149    373    579             747 
1999    182    456    729             912 
2000    182    455    728             911 
2001    151    378    605             756    
                                                 
1 Return on assets (ROA) is defined as Income before Extraordinary Items (Compustat Annual 
Data Item A237) divided by book value of Total Assets (Annual Item A6). 
2 Desai et al. (2002) report that for NASDAQ firms, the mean (median) short interest ranges 
from 0.51% (0.08%) to 1.14% (0.16%) between 1988 and 1994. Short Interests in Real Estate Investment Trusts    61
   
In Table 2, we report selected descriptive fundamental statistics on the 
sample REITs. In order to see if different levels of short interest are 
associated with different REIT characteristics, we report statistics on those 
samples with short interest in the 90
th, the 75
th, the 60
th, and the 50
th 
percentiles, respectively.  
 
In Panel A of Table 2, for REITs with short interest in the 90
th percentile, the 
mean (median) market value of equity is $1203.79 ($540.59) million. The 
market value of equity declines gradually in Panels B, C, and D when the 
short interest expands to include those in the 75
th, the 60
th, and the 50
th 
percentiles.  It suggests that large REITs have higher levels of short interest 
than small REITs on average. Given that short sellers have to deal with the 
possibility of a short squeeze, it is conceivable that they prefer to sell short 
the shares of larger REITs that are likely to be more liquid.  This conjecture 
is proved when we compare the average monthly turnover (shares traded as 
a percentage of shares outstanding) ratios among the four panels. In Panel A, 
REITs that are the most heavily (the 90
th percentile) shorted have a mean 
(median) monthly turnover ratio of 7.25% (4.10%). The turnover ratio 
declines consistently in Panels B, C, and D, confirming that the most liquid 
REITs are also the most heavily shorted.  
 
The most heavily shorted REITs also have a higher average market-to-book 
value of equity. The median market-to-book value declines gradually and 
consistently from 1.61 in Panel A to 1.36 in Panel D, whereas the mean also 
shows a decline though less obvious. It appears that short sellers on average 
prefer to sell short most heavily the REITs that have a low fundamental 
value relative to price.  The short sellers’ inclination to select poorly 
performing REITs is also observed when we compare the return on assets in 
the four panels in Table 2.  In Panel A, the mean and median ROA are 
2.76% and 2.27%, respectively. The ROA increases consistently from Panel 
A through Panel D to reach a mean and median of 3.36% and 2.89%. Thus, 
REITs with the lowest operating efficiency are the most heavily shorted. In 
sum, Table 2 suggests that short sellers of REITs are concerned about 
factors such as liquidity, fundamental value, and operating efficiency.  
 Li and Yung  62
     
Table 2: Selected descriptive statistics for the short interest sample 
 
Panel A: REITs with short interest in the 90
th percentile 
Variables                 Mean             Median                 25
th                    75
th    
                                Percentile           Percentile 
Market value ($millions)       1203.79  540.59                196.97             1891.92 
Market-to-book ratio                   1.83      1.61                1.19      2.03 
Short interest (%)                   2.64      2.25                1.72      3.11 
ROA (%)                     2.76      2.27                0.98      3.83 
Monthly turnover (%)                  7.25      4.10                5.82      8.44 
 
Panel B: REITs with short interest in the 75
th percentile 
Market value ($millions)        1128.37   588.41            231.34             1484.78 
Market-to-book ratio                    1.67       1.43                1.08       1.87 
Short interest (%)                    1.58       1.12                0.79       1.91 
ROA (%)                      3.25       2.79                1.43       3.89 
Monthly turnover (%)                   6.65       3.69                5.43       7.81 
 
Panel C: REITs with short interest in the 60
th percentile 
Variables                  Mean             Median                25
th     75
th    
                    Percentile         Percentile 
Market value ($millions)           985.17   537.72            228.12             1277.70 
Market-to-book ratio                     1.66       1.36                1.03       1.76 
Short interest (%)                     1.15       0.75                0.46       1.38 
ROA (%)                       3.27       2.82                1.50       3.91 
Monthly turnover (%)                    6.54       3.65                5.32       7.68 
 
Panel D: REITs with short interest in the 50
th percentile 
Market value ($millions)            891.93   479.65            202.93  1087.88 
Market-to-book ratio                      1.68       1.36                1.04        1.80 
Short interest (%)                      0.97       0.59                0.34        1.11 
ROA (%)                        3.36       2.89                1.53        4.12 
Monthly turnover (%)                     6.31       3.52                5.15        7.46 
 
 
Methodology and Regression Results 
The relationship between short interest and REIT returns 
We use a calendar-time portfolio approach in measuring long-horizon stock 
returns. The reasons, as mentioned in Desai et al. (2002), are due to some 
existing concerns over measuring long-horizon abnormal returns (e.g., 
Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997)). In addition, Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000) show that the calendar-time portfolio approach yields 
the most conservative results among existing methodologies in evaluating 
performance over long horizons. In this calendar-time portfolio approach, an 
event portfolio is formed each month to include all firms that experience an 
event in the previous month. Specifically, at the beginning of each month Short Interests in Real Estate Investment Trusts    63
   
from January 1994 to December 2001, we form equal-weighted portfolios of 
REITs that had short interest in the 90
th percentile in the previous month. 
The portfolios are rebalanced monthly to drop all REITs that did not meet 
the short interest requirement in the previous month and add REITs that 
attained the required short interest level in the previous month. An important 
advantage of this method is that the portfolio variance automatically takes 
into consideration the cross-sectional correlation among the individual 
securities that constitute the portfolio.  This advantage is particularly 
important in our study since all the firms in our sample come from the same 
industry. We repeat our portfolios formation process for REITs with short 
interest in the 75
th, 60
th, and 50
th percentiles, respectively. To evaluate the 
relationship between short interest and REIT returns, the following 
regression is performed: 
 
RPRFt = α0+ α1 RMRFt + α2 SMBt + α3 HML t + α4 PR1YRt + et     (1) 
 
where RPRF is the excess monthly portfolio return (the monthly portfolio 
return minus the one-month risk-free rate) of the REIT sample, RMRF is the 
excess market return (the NAREIT index is used here), SMB is the size 
factor, HML is the book-to-market factor, and PR1YR is the one-year 
momentum factor described in Carhart (1997).  
 
In Table 3, we report regression results for the relationship between short 
interest and REIT returns. The intercept for the most heavily shorted (the 
90
th percentile) REITs is –0.71% and is significant at the 1% level. That is, 
an investment strategy of holding heavily shorted REITs over the sample 
period yields an average negative abnormal return of  –0.71% per month. 




th percentiles, respectively, the intercept become insignificant. That is, 
short interest is not indiscriminately associated with negative REIT returns. 
Only very high levels of short interest (the 90
th percentile) have a negative 
relationship with REIT returns whereas lower levels of short interest have 
not.  A possible explanation is that investors cherish the favorable risk 
characteristics of real estate investments such that they are not easily swayed 
by low or moderate levels of short interest in REITs. Given that REIT 
investments in general require very specific information and considerable 
skills, another possible explanation is that the bearish content of short 
interest may have been mitigated by the skills of the professional REIT 
managers. Since our results show that short interests in REITs are not 
invariably associated with significant negative information, what we have 
found is consistent with the implication that on average short interests are 
more likely attempts to make short-term profits rather than overall 
bearishness regarding real estate investments.  Coefficients of the other 
independent variables in the four regressions in Table 3 are in general very 
consistent with those reported by Desai et al. (2002). It is interesting to note Li and Yung  64
     
that all the four regressions show that returns on REITs are negatively 
related to 1-year market momentum (PR1YR).  It confirms the general 
conjecture that investors consider real estate investments a tool for portfolio 
risk reduction.   
 
Table 3: Short interest and REIT returns (with monthly rebalancing) 
 
RPRFt = α0+ α1 RMRFt + α2 SMBt + α3 HML t + α4 PR1YRt + et
Percentile of 
short                                                                                                                         Adj.R
2
interest            Intercept      RMRF             SMB  HML      PR1YR                (%) 
90
th        –0.71%       0.8920             0.0734        –0.0147     –0.1090                 63 
       (–2.60)***   (11.07)***       (1.13)          (–0.22)     (–2.15)** 
 
75
th           0.19%        0.8930             0.0678        –0.0264     –0.0613                 81 
        (1.11)          (17.72)***       (1.67)           (–0.63)      (–1.93)** 
 
60
th         0.17%          0.8940             0.0495        –0.0175     –0.0611                 86 
        (1.20)          (21.97)***       (1.51)          (–0.51)      (–2.40)** 
 
50
th         0.19%          0.8860              0.0574       –0.0103     –0.0659                87 
        (1.41)          (22.75)***       (1.83)          (–0.32)       (–2.68)*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
In Table 4, we report regression results of the above model when each REIT 
is kept in the portfolio for 12 months after it first enters the portfolio. This 
alternative approach is used because we want to make sure the results 
reported in Table 3 are not outcomes caused by a monthly rebalancing 
trading strategy.
3   As can be seen from Table 4, the results are very similar 
and consistent with those in Table 3. Only very high levels of short interest 
(the 90
th percentile) have a negative effect on REIT returns and lower levels 
of short interest have no effect at all. That is, short interest does not 
indiscriminately imply negative information in the REIT industry.
4  
 
                                                 
3 We want to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the potential problem in Table 3. 
The alternative approach is also reported in Desai et al. (2002). 
4 We have also performed a simple regression between the monthly aggregate short interest 
(MONTHt) and the monthly NAREIT index (MONTHt+1). The insignificant regression 
coefficient provides further support that short interests in REITs are not associated with overall 
negative responses in the REIT industry. Short Interests in Real Estate Investment Trusts    65
   
Table 4: Short interest and REIT returns (without monthly rebalancing) 
 
RPRFt = α0+ α1 RMRFt + α2 SMBt + α3 HML t + α4 PR1YRt + et
Percentile of 
short                                                                                                                      Adj.R
2
interest    Intercept         RMRF           SMB           HML              PR1YR                  (%) 
90
th     –0.69%         0.8000          0.0590        0.0071   –0.0816                65 
    (–2.95)***      (11.71)***     (1.07)        (0.12)   (–1.89)* 
 
75
th        0.03%         0.9210          0.0474        0.0119   –0.0514                81 
     (0.19)          (17.88)***    (1.14)         (0.28)   (–1.58)* 
 
60
th        0.19%         0.9170          0.0441      –0.0256   –0.0467                85 
     (1.27)          (20.95)***    (1.25)         (–0.69)    (–1.69)* 
 
50
th       0.25%          0.8880         0.0430       –0.0240   –0.0559                88 
     (1.67)          (24.54)***    (1.41)         (–0.76)    (–2.35)*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
REIT performance alpha and short interest 
 
In Table 5, we report results examining whether REIT performance is 
related to short selling of REIT shares.  We obtain the performance alpha of 
each REIT by using a basic single index model in which we regress the 
REIT returns on the NAREIT index returns over the same period.
5 Then we 
divide the REITs into 3 groups according to their alpha (low [the bottom 
1/3], medium [the middle 1/3], and high [the top 1/3]). For each group of 
REITs, we perform the following regression: 
 
RPRFt = α0+ α1 RMRFt + α2 SMBt + α3 HMLt + α4 PR1YRt +  
SHORT INTERESTt –1 + et                                                         (2) 
 
Results in Table 5 show that short interest is significantly related to REIT 
returns only among REITs with low performance alpha (Group 1). The 
coefficient is –0.4040 and significant at the 5% level. For Groups 2 and 3, 
short interest is not significant at the 5% level. Thus, the negative signal sent 
out by short interest is effective only among REITs that have poor 
performances. The result is consistent with the implication that the bearish 
content of short interest is mitigated by the skills of the better performing 
REIT managers. The positive contribution of REIT managers is made 
                                                 
5 The performance alpha is analogical to the Jensen alpha in concept. We follow Jensen in using 
a single index model to find the alpha. However, we use the NAREIT index since the universe 
in our study consists of REITs only. Li and Yung  66
     
possible because the real estate market is informationally inefficient 
(Damodaran and Liu (1993)). Downs and Guner (1999) further conclude 
that the information flow in the real estate security markets may be as 
deficient as in the underlying asset market. In unreported descriptive 
statistics, the mean (median) alpha is –0.0096(–0.0048) for Group 1, 0.0041 
(0.0039) for Group 2, and 0.0165 (0.0108) for Group 3.  Thus, short interest 
affects only REITs that have a negative alpha.  The mean (median) short 
interest is 0.53% (0.19%) for Group 1, 0.52% (0.20%) for Group 2, and 
0.46% (0.13%) for Group 3. The median short interest of Group 3 is 
substantially lower than those of Group 2 and Group 1.  
 
Table 5: REIT performance and short interest  
 
RPRFt = α0+ α1 RMRFt + α2 SMBt + α3 HMLt + α4 PR1YRt + SHORT INTERESTt –1 + et 
 
Group 1:  REIT firms with low performance alpha (the lowest 1/3) 
                                                                                                            Short                 Adj.R
2
Intercept        RMRF         SMB            HML           PR1YR             interest                 (%) 
0.41%     0.8990       0.1440         –0.1160        -0.2010             –0.4040                 13 
(–1.91)**     (16.58)***   (3.00)***    (–2.27)**       (–6.26)***  (–2.00)** 
  
Group 2:  REIT firms with medium performance alpha (the middle 1/3) 
                                                                                               Short                Adj.R
2
Intercept       RMRF          SMB             HML          PR1YR     interest                 (%) 
0.44%       0.9080         0.0368          0.0052         –0.0193     –0.0757               32  
(5.65)***       (44.18)***  (2.02)**        (0.27)           (–1.61)      (–1.34) 
  
Group 3:  REIT firms with high performance alpha (the highest 1/3) 
                                                                                                                Short                Adj.R
2
Intercept       RMRF           SMB              HML          PR1YR       interest                (%) 
1.21%       0.5630         0.1790           0.0536         –0.0484     –0.1570                  8 
(6.22)***      (10.94)***   (4.00)***        (1.15)          (–1.69)       (–1.20) 
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Factors Affecting Short Selling 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that REITs with high levels of 
short interest have lower fundamental values and operating efficiencies.   
Hence, in Table 6 we formally investigate the REIT characteristics that 
promote heavy short-selling among investors. We use a logistic regression 
for the investigation. The model is as follows: 
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SHORT INTERESTt =α0+α1 SIZEt–1+α2 ROAt–1+α3 MKBKt–1+ 
α4 EXRET t–1 + TURNOVER RATIO t–1+et     (3) 
 
where  
SHORT INTEREST = a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if the 
short interest is not in the 90
th percentile and 1 if the short interest is; 
SIZE = firm size of REIT measured as the market capitalization; 
ROA = return on total asset of REIT; 
MKBK = ratio of market to book value of equity; 
EXRET = excess return of REIT over the NAREIT index; 
TURNOVER=monthly trading volume divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. 
 
Table 6: Logistic regression  
 
SHORT INTERESTt =α0+α1 SIZEt–1+α2 ROAt–1+α3 MKBKt–1+α4 EXRET t–1 +  
TURNOVER RATIO t–1+et
Intercept        SIZE         ROA         MKBK             EXRET        TURNOVER RATIO   
2.866        0.001       –10.263        0.146                0.250         10.726 
(–8.16)***      (5.34)***    (-2.33)**    (2.21)**           (0.66)          (2.69)***   
McFadden R-square is 10%.  
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Results in Table 6 indicate that short interest is negatively related to 
operating efficiency (ROA) and positively related to market-to-book ratio 
(fundamental value). This observation is reasonable and logical. Inefficient 
and/or overvalued REITs are likely to have higher levels of short interest. 
On the other hand, short interest is positively related to size and monthly 
turnover. It suggests liquidity is a concern when investors sell short. The 
likely intention is to avoid any undesirable outcome of a short squeeze. This 
observation is consistent with the earlier descriptive statistics in Table 2.  
The results in Table 6 point out that the short selling of REIT shares can be 
predicted by some firm-specific characteristics. Such an observation is 
consistent with the implication that the short selling of REIT shares is not 
caused by concerns about some system-wide risk characteristics of the 
industry.  
 
To further confirm that the short selling of REIT shares does not represent 
investors’ overall bearishness concerning real estate investments, we 
examine the time trend of REIT short interests and perform the following 
regression: 
 
SHORT INTERESTt = α0+ α1 MONTHt + α2 DUMMYt +et      (4) 
 
where SHORT INTEREST is the monthly ratio from January 1994 to Li and Yung  68
     
December 2001, MONTHt is a numerical value from 1 to 96 (from January 
1994 to December 2001), and Dummy is a (0,1) dummy variable that has a 
value of 1 in the 24 months of 1997 and 1998 and 0 in the other months. A 
simple correlation analysis has found that 1997 and 1998 are the only two 
years over our sample period that show a significant positive correlation 
between the monthly NAREIT and CRSP indices.  If investors are 
concerned about the diversification benefits of real estate related investments, 
1997 and 1998 would be the years that have significantly higher levels of 
short interest. 
 
Results in Table 7 show that MONTH has a positive coefficient significant 
at the 1% level. It is consistent with the overall trend in the stock markets 
that short interest is increasing over time. The dummy variable, on the other 
hand, has an insignificant coefficient. It suggests that the short interest levels 
in 1997 and 1998 were not significantly different from those of the other 
years over the sample period. That is, during a time period in which REIT 
returns and stock returns are positively correlated, investors had not 
increased their short selling of REIT shares.
6 The result provides further 
support to our earlier results that short interests in REITs do not imply 
investors are concerned about some system-wide risk characteristics of the 
industry. Instead, it is more likely that short selling of REIT shares 
represents attempts to make short-term profits. 
 
Table 7: Time trend of short interest  
 
SHORT INTERESTt = α0+ α1 MONTHt + α2 DUMMYt +et




     0.0070 
    (15.82)*** 
–0.0213        
  (–0.75) 
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Investors find real estate investments attractive because despite historical 
returns on real estate that are equal to or slightly lower than returns on 
common stocks, real estate possesses very favorable risk characteristics. 
Short selling of REIT shares implies either investors want to make short-
term profits or that investors are bearish about the advantage of real estate 
investments. We examine the short interests in equity REITs between 1994 
and 2001. We find that only high levels (the 90
th percentile) of short interest 
                                                 
6 We have also compared the annual aggregate short interests of REITs with those of the stock 
markets over the study period. The annual rates of change of the two series are comparable. Short Interests in Real Estate Investment Trusts    69
   
convey negative information to the market. Moderate and low levels of short 
interest do not have a significant negative relationship with REIT returns. 
The result is consistent with the implication that the bearish content of short 
interest is mitigated by the favorable risk characteristics of real estate 
securities or the skills of the REIT managers. That is, short interest is not 
indiscriminately associated with negative REIT returns. Our analysis also 
shows that the negative relationship between short interest and REIT returns 
is only true among poorly performing REITs (those with a negative 
performance alpha). The results of a logistic regression model further show 
that short interests in REITs are related to firm-specific factors such as 
operating efficiency, fundamental value, and liquidity. Given that short 
interests in REITs do not invariably imply bad news and are related to some 
firm-specific characteristics, we find the results consistent with implications 
that short selling of REIT shares represents attempts to make short-term 
profits. And given that the short selling of REIT shares had not increased 
significantly in 1997 and 1998, the years in which the NAREIT and CRSP 
indices were significantly positively related, our results are consistent with 
implications that short interests in REITs do not imply general bearishness 
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